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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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STATEMENT #2 UNCLASSIFIED

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*Asst. Sec. for For. Aff.
Dept. of Army
Wash DC 20310*

Headquarters
507th Transportation Group (Movement Control)
APO San Francisco 96309

AVGI-AG

15 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,
Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65.

SECTION 1

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SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

The 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control) was designated Traffic Management Agency-MACV by MACV General Order Number 302, 9 March 1966. During the months of August, September and October the Group continued to perform its primary missions of coordinating MACV's transportation movements and managing MACV's common-user transportation resources. During this period primary emphasis was placed in the following areas.

1. Expansion of operations:

Additional field elements were established throughout Vietnam in order to meet increased transportation requirements generated by the continued buildup of forces and facilities. A District Transportation Office (DTO) was installed in the Hue-Phu Bai area in August and another established at Chu Lai in October. Aerial Transportation Coordinating Officers (ATCO's) became operational at Bien Hoa Air Force Base and Vung Tau Airfield during August. Highway Regulating Teams that arrived in August were located at An Khe, Qui Nhon, Pleiku, Phan Rang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa and Vung Tau. As the opening of key highways connecting these cities continues to progress the teams will play an increasingly important role in coordinating and controlling line haul transportation operations.

In response to the initiation of additional cargo and passenger channels into Bien Hoa and Cam Ranh Bay by Military Airlift Command (MAC), this headquarters initiated plans for the development of Tri-Service ATCO's at both locations. Personnel and equipment assets of the TMA must be augmented by assets from other services through inter-service agreements in order to meet this requirement. The groundwork for such augmentation has been laid, but until the required assets are made available the operational burden will rest with the TMA ATCO's presently existing at both locations.

In anticipation of further transportation requirements, appropriate studies were directed within the headquarters in order to delineate those geographic areas where additional field elements may become necessary, particularly in the I and IV Corps Tactical Zones.

2. Decentralization of Functional Responsibilities.

The scope and complexity of the transportation problem facing TMA upon its arrival in Vietnam dictated that the headquarters assume many operational functions in order to establish an organized system and isolate and resolve major problem areas. Throughout the reporting period major efforts were directed toward decentralizing operational functions down to the regional and district transportation offices. In this manner the headquarters was

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freed from numerous operational requirements which were hampering its ability to perform as a manager of MACV's common-user transportation. The respective regions and districts were made more responsive to customer requirements by the added operational authority and shortening of transportation request channels.

3. Normal Operations:

Throughout the ninety-two (92) days of the reporting period TMA carried on normal operations.

SECTION 2

COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I - Observations (Lessons Learned)

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1. Personnel: None

2. Operations:

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MILSTAMP Implementation

Item: Centralized monitoring of implementation procedures.

Discussion: When an all inclusive system such as MILSTAMP is implemented in a theater of operations a central agency must monitor the problems experienced by all elements involved. A great volume of correspondence was generated by all levels of command concerning various MILSTAMP procedures, but a complete picture of the system with all of its aspects was not always provided by a single agency. Such a picture is necessary if higher echelon action agencies are to correctly evaluate and resolve problem areas.

Observation: Since the designation of TMA as MACV's single point of contact for MILSTAMP matters in October a much more comprehensive evaluation has been achieved.

Item: Rapid Transmission of cargo documentation.

Discussion: Transmission of documentation to arrive at offloading ports prior to the vessels' arrival has been major problem area in RVN. Emphasis has been placed on prompt manifest transmission with subsequent improvements resulting. However, the problem remains acute where Intra-RVN shipments are concerned due to short vessel transitory times.

Manifest transmission via transceived punch cards presents the proper solution to the Inter-RVN problem.

Observation: Transceived manifests were initiated for vessels arriving Saigon in October with studies undertaken to establish a network capability throughout RVN utilizing the ADPS capability existing within component commands. The magnitude of MILSTAMP and its importance in the logistical network warrants that consideration be given to equipping major terminal service units with ADPS capabilities prior to deployment to a combat zone.

Airlift Operations

Item: Movement of troop units from POD to in-country locations.

Discussion: Efficient movement of troop units from port of debarkation to in-country locations necessitates thorough and timely forecasting of the airlift requirement on the part of local area support commands. Shortcomings in this area left TMA with inadequate reaction time in some instances.

Observation: Preplanning conferences, were established between the Logistics Operation Center of 1st Log Command and TMA which provided early warning and more reaction time for airlifting incoming units.

Item: Aircraft utilization in moving troops from POD.

Discussion: Scheduling load times of aircraft to coincide with availability of troops discharging from CONUS troop vessels has presented a problem in RVN. Initially, the arrival of aircraft was requested to coincide with vessel arrival. Excessive ground time was experienced by aircraft crews who had to wait for troops to be shuttled ashore, processed and moved to the airfield.

Observation: Experience gained from Operations Bluejay and Robin, among others, proved that to minimize ground time and maximize flying time the aircraft loading time should be approximately three (3) hours after the vessel has dropped anchor.

Item: Cargo arrival at Aerial Ports.

Discussion: Cargo for special mission aircraft must be scheduled into aerial ports in a manner which provides for late arrival of the cargo or early arrival of the aircraft. This is particularly true in RVN where highway transport assets face heavy requirements that at times preclude exact delivery times.

Observation: Loading times for all special mission aircraft are now established as two (2) hours prior to arrival or block time of aircraft.

Item: Movement of ARVN units.

Discussion: Difficulties were experienced in the expeditious movement of ARVN units from training centers due to a time lag in their submission of airlift requests.

Observation: Projected training schedules were obtained from the ARVN Training Directorate which allow the TMA airlift center to closely coordinate movements with the ARVN High Command thus reducing request and transit time.

Sealift Operations

Item: Nomination of cargo for shipment.

Discussion: Cargo was customarily nominated for LST's and other intra-coastal shipping by this headquarters based on offerings received from the Traffic Regions and District Traffic Offices. This procedure was found to be unsatisfactory in that this office did not have direct contact with shippers as is required to provide desired responsiveness and flexibility.

Observation: Authority to nominate cargo for shipment was delegated to Traffic Regions and District Traffic Offices and has provided a greater degree of flexibility and responsiveness to individual shipper requirements.

Item: LST Scheduling.

Discussion: LST scheduling was initially planned three to four voyages in advance. This resulted in unpredictable ETA's at ports as vessels were frequently delayed along the route by slow loading or discharge at various ports. Scheduling has now been changed to reflect not more than two voyages at a time.

Observation: This procedure has been successful in that waiting time for LST's has been reduced and shippers and ports are provided much more accurate MTA's for planning purposes.

Item: Cargo Clearance Orders.

Observations: Information received from shippers indicated that they were receiving insufficient advance notice from port operators to move cargo into ports for loading. It was found that port operators were also receiving short notice in many cases because cargo clearance orders were being delayed in route through message centers. Cargo clearance orders are now disseminated immediately by telephone as well as by message. In addition, a liaison team from TMA has been established at Saigon Port to effect better coordination.

Observation: Prompt dissemination of cargo clearance orders is mandatory to permit port operators maximum load planning time to move all cargo into the port. This insures maximum vessel utilization.

Item: Vessel Diversions.

Discussion: Transportation agencies must be fully informed of changes in location of units in order to expeditiously divert vessels carrying UAI cargo, additionally prompt assessment and reporting of changes in logistical requirements facilitates vessel diversions to place the commodity where it is needed and avoid transshipments. During the reporting period, a sharp increase in vessel diversions was experienced for these reasons.

Observations: Vessel diversions impact favorably in that cargo arrives where needed more expeditiously. Also, a saving of in-country transportation assets is experienced through the avoidance of transshipments. However, diversions impact unfavorably to the extent that existing schedules and forecasts can be significantly disrupted and shipping agencies along the line left misinformed unless close coordination is effected between all concerned. For these reasons TMA has included PAMPA in Oakland, Calif. as an addressee on all vessel diversion messages to facilitate the latter's

5 role in monitoring RVN port workloads and planning cargo flow into RVN. Similarly, MSTS Far East in Yokohama was made an addressee on all vessel routing messages to provide them a more accurate picture of RVN vessel status.

Land Movements Operations

Item: Roll On/Roll Off Trailer Fleet.

Discussion: During July RO/RO trailers began to accumulate in the Saigon area as consignees failed to offload them rapidly. This threatened to disrupt RO/RO operations between Okinawa and Saigon as the former area experienced a trailer shortage for loading of additional cargo.

Observation: When RO/RO operations are implemented within a theater of operations there must be strong and specific initial guidance furnished to all users of the system. Through conferences and additional implementing instructions presented during early August the number of trailers in the Saigon area was substantially reduced.

Item: Vietnamese Railroad.

Discussion: The heavy requirements placed on other modes of transportation, particularly air, continue to illustrate the need for further development and use of the Vietnamese National Railway. Increased emphasis has been placed upon the utilization of this mode, but the progress is hampered by a lack of rolling stock, especially flat cars for the Saigon area. This shortage has resulted in Vietnamese rail officials being unable to fulfill verbal agreements allocating 17 flat cars and 85 box cars exclusively for the use of U.S. Forces. U.S. owned rail cars are scheduled to begin arriving in February 1967 which will provide relief in the area.

Observation: For the overall transportation system to function properly emphasis must continue to be placed on the expansion of rail capability and its utilization whenever possible.

3. Training and Organization: None
4. Intelligence: None
5. Logistics: None
6. Other: None

Part II - Recommendations - None

/s/ W. G. Stollan LTC

for W.W. AKERS
COL, TC
Commanding

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

31 DEC '66

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT -
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control).

2. Reference Paragraph 2, Part 1, Section 2, Item: Rapid Transmission of Cargo Documentation:

a. Concur that major terminal service units should have ADPE capability available for MILSTAMP processing requirements. A similar capability is also needed to account for and maintain control of government sponsored USAID/CI commodities and commercially manifested CIP shipments.

b. This subject is currently being studied by representatives of 1st Logistical Command. Whether it is desirable to provide an organic ADP capability within each terminal unit largely depends on outcome of this study. Present and planned ADP systems and facilities within 1st Logistical Command may be sufficient to satisfy these requirements on a time-sharing or service center basis.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W.R. AUTREY

Cpt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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GPOP-OT (18 Nov 66)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

20 JAN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



G. L. McMULLIN

CPT, AGC

Asst AG

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